Utah v. Buford : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Utah v. Buford : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; James C. Bradshaw; Attorneys for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Buford, No. 900444 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2837








IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DOCKET NO. 





Case No. 900444-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
JOAN C. WATT 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
",1 
Ufc 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 900444-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. 
JOAN C. WATT 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
23 6 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Ill 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 11 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH 
WARRANT IN THIS CASE. 13 
A. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID UNDER 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 13 
1. Material Misrepresentations 
Were Included in the Affidavit and 
Material Information Was Omitted 
Therefrom. 15 
2. The Material Misrepresenta-
tions and Omissions Were Made 
Intentionally or With a Reckless 
Disregard for Their Truth. . . . . 17 
3. Probable Cause Did Not Exist 
Absent the Misrepresentations. . . 21 
B. THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING 
AFFIDAVIT WERE INVALID UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 26 
POINT II. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I. 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 33 
POINT III. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. . . . 36 
Page 
POINT IV. "GOOD FAITH" DOES NOT SAVE THE 
WARRANT UNDER EITHER THE UTAH OR UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUION. 37 
A. THE FEDERAL GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES 
NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE 37 
B. A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT 
EXIST UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. . . . 39 
CONCLUSION 42 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Aquilar v. Texas. 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 
L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) 2, 12, 21, 
22, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 
36, 37 
Commonwealth v. Upton. 480 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1983) . 35 
Franks v. Delaware. 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 
57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) 13, 14, 28, 
29, 37 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 
76 L.Ed.2d 527, reh/a;. denied 463 U.S. 1237, 104 
S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 1453 (1983) 3, 12, 21, 
34, 39, 40 
Massachusetts v. Sheppard. 468 U.S. 981, 1045 S.Ct. 
3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) 37, 38 
Moreau v. State. 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978) 29 
People V. Biaelow. 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451 
(1985) 37 
People V. Cook. 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978) 29, 30, 31, 
32 
People v. Johnson. 488 N.E.2d 439 (NY 1985) 35 
People v. Sundlinq. 153 Mich. App. 277, 395 N.W.2d 
308 (1986) 39 
People v. Theodor. 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) (modified 
on denial of reh'q.) 32 
Spinelli v. United States. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 
584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) 2, 12, 21, 
22, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 
36, 37 
State v. Anderton. 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983) . . . . 22 
iii 
Page 
State v. Bailey. 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984) 22, 23, 24, 
33, 36 
State v. Brown. 798 P.2d 284 (Utah App. 1990) . . . . 22, 24 
State v. Caldwell. 384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980) 29, 30 
State v. Carter, slip op. Case No. 900303-CA (Utah 
App. March 21, 1991) 2,3 
State v. Carter. 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 (1988). 39 
State v. Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 1989) . 21, 22, 23, 
24, 33, 36 
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) 26 
State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987) 23, 33 
State v. Hvah. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) 26, 27 
State v. Jackson. 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984) 34, 35 
State v. Jones. 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985) 34, 35 
State v. Kimbro. 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985) 34 
State v. Laffertv. 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988) . . . . 26 
State v. Larocco. 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987) 
(overruled) 26 
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 26, 27, 32, 
33, 35, 36, 
41 
State v. Malkin. 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986) 29 
State v. Marsala. 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58 (1990) . 39, 40 
State v. Miller. 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987) . . . 15 
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert. 
denied 107 S.Ct. 1565 14, 15, 18, 
28, 31 
State v. Novembrino. 105 N.J. 95, 579 A.2d 820 (1987) 39 
iv 
Page 
State v. Rowe. 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah App. 1991) 37, 38, 39, 
40 
State v. Sims, slip op. Case No. 890463-CA (March 15, 
1991) 26, 28, 32, 
33 
State v. Slowe. 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), reh/3. 
denied (1986) 13, 14 
State v. Thompson. Case No. 880181 (March 21, 1991) . 38, 39, 40 
State v. Watts. 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988) 26 
United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 
613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 40, 41 
United States v. Frietas. 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 
1986) 37 
United States v. Hunt. 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974) . 29 
United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 397, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 
82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) 37, 38, 39, 
40 
United States v. Thomas. 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974) 29 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended) 1 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 1 
Amend. IV, Constitution of the United States . . . . 1, 2, 3, 
11, 12, 23, 
28, 36, 37, 
38 
Art. I, § 14, Constitution of Utah 1 , 2 , 3 , 
11, 12, 26, 
27, 30, 31, 
32, 33, 34, 




LaFave, W., Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the 
Fourth Amendment, § 3.3 (1984 Supp.) 
Note, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. Gates: 
A Call for State Courts to Develop State 
Constitutional Lav, 1987 U.111.L.Rev. 311 (1987) . 
Ryan, Is the Two-Prong Test of Aguilar-Spinelli Alive 
and Well in California?, 13 W.St.U.L.Rev. 45 (1985) 
vi 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 900444-CA 
Priority No, 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides: 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance 
of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence seized in violation of the United 
States or Utah Constitutions as the result of material 
misrepresentations in the affidavit? 
a. Did material misrepresentations in and omissions 
from the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
invalidate the warrant under the fourth amendment? 
i. Were material misrepresentations included in 
the affidavit and material information omitted 
therefrom? 
ii. Did the officers act intentionally or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth in including material 
false information or in omitting other material 
information? 
iii. Absent the misrepresentations, did the 
affidavit establish probable cause? 
b. Did material misrepresentations and omissions from 
the affidavit invalidate the search warrant under 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution? 
The standard of review for any factual 
assessments underlying a determination that probable 
cause existed is a "clearly erroneous" standard; the 
conclusion that probable cause existed is a legal 
conclusion, and a correction of the error standard 
is applicable. See State v. Carter, Case No. 
900303-CA slip op. at 14, fn. 8 (March 21, 1991). 
2. Should the two-prong Aauilar-Spinelli test be followed 
when analyzing a search warrant affidavit under Article I, 
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section 14 of the Utah Constitution, and, if so, did the affidavit 
in this case fail to establish probable cause under the state 
constitution? 
The issue as to the appropriate analysis under 
Article I, section 14 and the determination as to 
whether probable cause was established are questions 
of law; factual assessments underlying the 
determination are subject to a clearly erroneous 
standard. State v. Carter, slip op. at 14, fn. 8. 
3. Did the affidavit fail to state probable cause under 
the Gates totality of the circumstances test? 
The standard set forth under 2 above is 
applicable to this issue. 
4. Does the good faith exception save the search under 
either the fourth amendment or Article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
This issue presents a question of law for this 
Court, and a correction of the error standard is 
appropriate. Any underlying factual determinations 
are given deference. See State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 
326 (Utah 1989); State v. Maurer. 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated January 6, 1989, the State charged 
Ophelia Buford with a single count of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree felony. 
On April 13, 1989, Ms. Buford filed a Motion to Suppress 
all evidence seized in violation of her rights under the fourth and 
- 3 -
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. R. 43-4. Following 
an evidentiary hearing held on July 14 and August 22-23, 1989, the 
trial court denied the motion. R. 58, 83, 85, 86, 87-92, 210-3. 
See Addendum A for copy of trial court's "Amended Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law." 
After a jury trial held on June 7 and 8, 1990, a jury 
convicted Ms. Buford as charged. R. 114-6. Judge Uno sentenced 
Ms. Buford to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
R. 200. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On January 3, 1989, Salt Lake City police officer Donald 
Zane Smith came in contact with a prostitute named Yolanda Rodriguez 
("Yolanda") at 7th West and North Temple. R. 234:8, 46, 47; 
R. 229:6, 78. Officer Smith was assigned to the Metro Narcotics 
Task Force and was in plain clothes and an undercover patrol car. 
R. 234:8. Officer Smith did not know Yolanda nor had he worked with 
her in the past. R. 234:47, R. 229:4. He did not tell her that he 
was a police officer. R. 234:9. 
The initial conversation between the officer and Yolanda 
had to do with whether he wanted a "date"1; however, after Yolanda 
had gotten into the officer's car, he informed her that he wanted to 
buy some cocaine. R. 234:8, 46, 47; R. 229:78. 
1
 Officer Smith testified that asking for a "date" "would 
indicate that she was propositioning [him]." R. 234:47. 
- 4 
Yolanda was a cocaine addict who had been using cocaine 
when she encountered Officer Smith. R. 229:4, 70; R. 230:6, 13, 
44.2 She agreed to help him get some cocaine, and the pair went to 
a house located at 474 North Grant Street (740 West). R. 234:9, 48. 
Outside the house, Officer Smith gave Ms. Rodriguez some 
money to buy cocaine for him. The serial numbers of the money were 
not recorded and he did not search Yolanda prior to her entering the 
house. R. 234:9. 
When Yolanda returned, she gave some cocaine to Officer 
Smith. R. 234:9; R. 229:8. The officer could not recall whether he 
then gave some to her; she testified that he gave her a portion for 
her own use. R. 229:85. Officer Smith did not search Ms. Rodriguez 
and did not know whether she still had the money he had given her. 
R. 229:9. Yolanda still did not know that Smith was a police 
officer. 
Officer Smith told Yolanda that he wanted to meet her and 
purchase more drugs later that evening if the cocaine she provided 
him was good. R. 234:49. Officer Smith then dropped Yolanda off, 
probably on North Temple where he had first encountered her. 
R. 234:49. 
Later that evening, at about 10:00 p.m., Officer Smith, 
along with Detectives Sayes and Dewitt, went back to the Winchell's 
2
 Although Officer Smith initially claimed that he did not 
have time to observe whether Ms. Rodriguez was "strung out" or had 
tracks on her arm, he did acknowledge that "most, if not all of the 
prostitutes working on North Temple are addicted to drugs." 
R. 234:48. Later, Officer Smith testified that Ms. Rodriguez did 
not appear to be "strung out." R. 229:5. 
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located at 8th West and North Temple, informed Yolanda that they 
were police officers, and, according to Officer Smith, arrested her 
based on the "unwitting" buy she had made earlier that evening. 
R. 234:10. After arresting Yolanda, Officer Smith discussed with 
her the possibility of her cooperating with the officers in making a 
controlled buy at the premises so that the officers could obtain a 
search warrant. R. 234:11. Officer Smith told Yolanda that he 
would speak to the county attorney's office on her behalf if she 
would help him by making the controlled buy. R. 229:12. Yolanda 
agreed to work with the officers. R. 229:ll.3 
During the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Officer Smith 
testified that Yolanda had told him she had dealt with Bobby and 
Fifi, but that she made the unwitting buy from "Bobby," a large 
black male. R. 229:16; R. 234:11. 
During the hearing, Officer Smith acknowledged that the 
statement in the affidavit that Yolanda had bought drugs from Fifi 
on each occasion was not true. R. 229:17. In somewhat confusing 
testimony, he then indicated that he was testifying from memory, and 
that although he had a specific recollection that she had told him 
that she purchased the drugs from a large black male named "Bobby," 
the search warrant affidavit was prepared closer in time to the 
incident and would be more accurate. R. 229:18. He acknowledged, 
3
 Yolanda claimed that the officers told her that they 
would not arrest her for the unwitting buy if she cooperated with 
them. R. 229:69. Officer Smith testified that he screened the case 
which had been based on an unwitting buy with a deputy county 
attorney and decided not to prosecute because Yolanda had 
cooperated. R. 229:13. 
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however, that Detective McCarthy prepared the affidavit while 
Officer Smith was attempting to make a controlled buy at the 
residence. R. 229:49-50. 
Officer Smith later testified that he knew that Yolanda had 
told him that Bobby was present, but he was not sure whether she 
stated that she made the transaction with him or Fifi. R. 229:21, 
42. Later, the officer acknowledged that "Fifi" was not involved in 
the controlled buy and that that portion of the affidavit was 
incorrect. R. 229:63. 
Yolanda consistently testified that she told the officers 
that she made the unwitting purchase from a big, tall black man. 
R. 230:2; R. 229:80. Yolanda also testified that she did not tell 
the officers that she had purchased drugs from "Fifi," and she did 
not in fact purchase drugs from "Fifi" during the unwitting buy or 
in the past. R. 229:75; R. 229:71, 81. She testified further that 
"Fifi" had not been present during the earlier transaction. 
Although it would be a common question to ask an informant 
whether he or she saw scales and other paraphernalia inside the 
premises, Officer Smith could not recall whether he had asked 
Yolanda such a question. R. 229:21. Officer Smith contacted other 
officers with information about the residence who identified the 
suspect known as Fifi as Ophelia Buford. R. 234:14-51. He also 
testified that he received information that drug transactions 
occurred at the premises and that some of the people involved had 
"aggravated criminal histories." R. 234:15-6. 
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After Officer Smith attempted to gather information about 
the house, Detective McCarthy typed up a search warrant. R. 234:17; 
R. 229:49-50. Officer Smith was the affiant; however, he was not 
present while the search warrant was being put together, and did not 
have an opportunity to review it at that time. R. 234:17. The 
affidavit was prepared prior to any controlled buy being made and 
included "facts" which anticipated what would occur during the 
course of a "controlled buy." 
After Officer Smith completed his interview of Yolanda, he 
directed Officer Oman to search her. R. 234:18-9, 41. Such a 
search is standard operating procedure for a "controlled buy," and 
is done to insure that the person does not take in anything that can 
later be used as evidence. R. 2 34:42. 
According to Yolanda, after the search, Officer Smith 
picked up her gloves which contained a syringe, felt the syringe, 
then gave the gloves and syringe back to her, thereby allowing her 
to take her syringe into the house. R. 230:35. Officer Smith 
denied that he knew that she had a syringe when she entered the 
house for the "controlled" buy. R. 229:24. 
Officer Smith placed a transmitting device on Yolanda and 
gave her two hundred dollars which had been photocopied. 
R. 229:24. He also took down the serial numbers of the bills. 
R. 234:19. 
Shortly after midnight on January 4, 1989, four officers in 
two cars waited outside the residence while Yolanda went inside to 
make a buy. R. 234:20. The officers listened to Yolanda talk with 
- 8 -
a man about the details of a drug transaction. R. 234:22; 
R. 229:25. The male voice then began making statements which the 
officers characterized as sexual advances to Yolanda. R. 234:23. 
The officers could not remember the exact statements made. 
Eventually, Yolanda asked the officers for help through the 
transmitter. R. 234:24. After the third or fourth request, the 
officers ran towards the house, kicked the door in, and entered the 
premises. R. 234:24-5. 
The officers initially went upstairs where they encountered 
several people. R. 234:28, 29; R. 229:35-6; R. 231:136. The 
defendant, Ophelia Buford, was one of those people. R. 231:137. 
Although the affidavit indicated that the officers observed cocaine 
in plain view when they entered the upstairs room which was occupied 
by Ms. Buford and several others, Officer Smith testified that he 
did not notice any cocaine in plain view. R. 229:36-7.4 After 
securing the upper level, the officers went to the main floor where 
they found Yolanda in a bathroom. R. 234:28; R. 229:33. The 
officers found a syringe in the bathroom with Yolanda; although 
Officer Smith testified that Yolanda was frantic, he also stated 
that he did not have time to observe whether she was high. 
R. 229:34. 
The officers had not yet located Bobby so they continued 
their search downstairs. R. 234:30-31. In the basement, the 
4
 Officer Smith testified that he thought maybe someone 
else had told him cocaine was on the nightstand in the room, 
possibly Officer Sayes, but he was not sure. He himself did not see 
any cocaine. R. 229:29-40. 
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officers found a large black man (approximately six feet eight 
inches, 260 pounds) whom they believed to be Bobby hiding under a 
bed. R. 234:30-1. 
Officer Smith did not recall whether he got any of the buy 
money back from Yolanda; he did not search her after the officers 
entered the premises. R. 299:28. Nor did he receive cocaine from 
her. He testified that the buy money was eventually located in the 
house. R. 229:28. Yolanda testified that no one searched her after 
the aborted buy and that she kept the change from the transaction. 
R. 230:37, 40. 
Several officers secured the premises while Officer Smith 
returned to the metro offices and assisted Detective McCarthy in the 
final preparation of the search warrant affidavit. R. 234:33. The 
officers attached an additional page three to the affidavit that 
Detective McCcirthy had previously prepared. R. 174, 177. See 
Addendum B for copy of affidavit, including additional page three. 
Officer Smith testified that he attached the extra page because the 
information in the affidavit indicating that a controlled buy had 
been made was incorrect. R. 229:35. 
In the affidavit, Officer Smith referred to Yolanda as a 
reliable informant even though he had not known or used her prior to 
that night. R. 229:3-4, 6. He considered her reliable because: 
I based that on my interview that I conducted with 
her, subsequent to her arrest. We discussed former 
persons that we had both dealt with, and, to some 
degree, some investigations that are still ongoing. 
To supplement that I had planned to make a 
controlled buy on the premises. 
- 10 -
R. 229:46. 
After meeting with Detective McCarthy, Officer Smith went 
to the residence of a circuit court judge and obtained a search 
warrant at 1:40 a.m.5 R. 234:36. He then returned to the premises 
and, along with other officers, conducted a search. R. 234:40. 
During the search, the officers found a T.V. tray in the 
upstairs east bedroom which contained various items of drug 
paraphernalia and an eighth of an ounce of cocaine. R. 231:154-5. 
In the closet of that same bedroom, the officers found a purse 
containing cocaine, among other things. R. 231:162, 165-6. The 
officers linked the purse to Ms. Buford through clothing and shoes 
found in the closet, items found in the purse, and residency papers 
found in the bedroom. R. 231:160-1, 170-1. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The officer intentionally or with a reckless disregard for 
the truth misrepresented material information in the search warrant 
affidavit and intentionally omitted information therefrom. When the 
information is excised and omissions added, the affidavit fails to 
establish probable cause, in violation of the fourth amendment. 
Pursuant to Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
this Court should employ a distinct analysis from the federal fourth 
5
 The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
contain a finding that the search warrant was presented and signed 
at approximately 1:40 p.m. R. 212. This is clearly erroneous; the 
search warrant was obtained in the middle of the night, at 
1:40 a.m. R. 234:39-41. See Addendum A. 
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amendment analysis when officers intentionally, recklessly or 
negligently include material false information in a search warrant 
affidavit or omit material information therefrom. Under such 
analysis, the search warrant should not be upheld where the officer 
acted recklessly or intentionally. Where the officer acted 
negligently, the false information should be excised, and the 
remaining information assessed under the two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli 
test to determine whether the affidavit established probable cause. 
In the present case, the affidavit fails under the Utah Constitution. 
Pursuant to Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, 
the two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli test, rather than the Gates "totality 
of the circumstances" test, should be utilized in assessing whether 
an affidavit in support of a search warrant establishes probable 
cause. In this case, even if the false infomration is considered, 
the affidavit did not establish probable cause under the two-prong 
Aquilar-Spinelli test. 
Applying the Gates test, the affidavit did not establish 
probable cause under the fourth amendment. 
The federal good faith exception does not save the search 
because such exception is not applicable where officers 
intentionally or recklessly misrepresent information in the 
affidavit, or the facts alleged are insufficient to allow reasonable 
reliance thereon. A good faith exception should not exist under 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution; the exclusionary 
rule under the Utah Constitution is constitutionally generated and 
not judicially created. Even if there were a good faith exception 
- 12 -
under the Utah Constitution, the facts and circumstances of this 
case do not fit within that exception. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS IN THE 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT 
IN THIS CASE. 
A. THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS INVALID UNDER THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION. 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 
57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
defendant has the right to an evidentiary hearing where he or she 
makes a preliminary showing that a false statement was intentionally 
included in a search warrant affidavit, or was included with a 
reckless disregard for the truth, and such false statement was 
necessary to a finding of probable cause. 438 U.S. at 156. 
At such hearing, if the defendant establishes by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the false statement was 
intentionally included, or included with a reckless disregard for 
the truth, the false material must be excised from the affidavit and 
the remaining information contained in the affidavit must be 
reviewed for a determination as to whether it supports a finding of 
probable cause. If probable cause does not exist without the 
excised material, the search warrant must be voided and the items 
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seized under the warrant excluded "to the same extent as if probable 
cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit." Id. 
In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), reh'g. denied 
(1986), the Utah Supreme Court, citing Franks v. Delaware, 
acknowledged that ,f[f]alse statements in a probable cause affidavit 
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a 
warrant issued in reliance thereon. [citation omitted]." Id. at 
111. In Slowe, the officers prepared the affidavit prior to a 
transaction which was part of a "sting" operation. The transaction 
occurred as anticipated, and the statements in the affidavit were, 
for the most part, accurate. Although the Court indicated that it 
did not condone the pre-preparation of search warrant affidavits, it 
nevertheless upheld the warrant because "[t]he minor discrepancies 
that did occur did not undermine the essential truth of the 
allegations or rise to the level of knowingly, intentionally or 
recklessly making a false statement." Id. at 111. Id. at 111-2. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565, decided shortly after Slowe, the Utah 
Supreme Court followed the fourth amendment analysis in Franks v. 
Delaware but extended that analysis to include material omissions as 
well as material misrepresentations. In Nielsen, the officer swore 
in the affidavit that a confidential informant ("C.I.") had given 
him certain information; the officer also attested to the 
informant's reliability based on prior transactions with the C.I. 
At the preliminary hearing, the officer essentially reiterated the 
statements in the affidavit. Id. at 190. 
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After the preliminary hearing, the State revealed that the 
affiant did not know or have contact with the C.I. and had received 
the information in the affidavit from another officer who had worked 
with the confidential informant. Id. 
The Supreme Court determined that the State's contention 
that the false statements were not made intentionally or with a 
reckless disregard for the truth were "entirely unpersuasive." 
Despite the intentional false statements made by the 
officer in the affidavit in Nielsen, the Court upheld the search 
warrant "under federal law" (Id. at 192) because the falsehood "was 
not material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause." Id. at 
191. See also State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987). 
1. Material Misrepresentations Were Included in the 
Affidavit and Material Information Was Omitted 
Therefrom. 
In the present case, the affidavit contained the following 
falsehoods: 
1. The statement in paragraph 7 on page two 
that "RI told your affiant that each buy of cocaine 
was made from Fifi . . . " 
2. The statement in paragraph 5 on page two 
that a controlled buy was made within the past eight 
hours, as well as all statements relating to that 
controlled buy. 
Statements relating to the controlled buy are 
as follows: 
a. The RI was searched after the 
controlled buy (paragraph 6). 
b. "RI was found in possession of cocaine 
after the buy and did not have the Metro Buy 
Money." (paragraph 6) 
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c. "Affiant believes that the Metro buy 
money listed this warrant/affidavit will still 
be on the premises. (paragraph 9 on page three) 
d. Information that the controlled buy 
was made from "Fifi." 
A further misrepresentation and/or material omission in the 
affidavit involved the officer's depiction of Yolanda as a "reliable 
informant." Although Officer Smith referred to Yolanda as a 
reliable informant or "RI" at least fifteen times in the affidavit, 
he neglected to inform the magistrate that neither he nor other 
officers had met or used Yolanda prior to that night, that Yolanda 
was a prostitute and drug addict who Officer Smith had met several 
hours earlier when he approached her on the street and the pair 
discussed a "date," and that Yolanda had been placed under arrest 
for her role in the unwitting buy and told that the officers would 
ask the prosecutor to dismiss the case if she cooperated.6 
R. 229:4, 70; R. 234:8, 46, 47. 
In the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
trial court made the following findings regarding the falsehoods 
listed above: 
1. "The testimony adduced during the course 
of the suppression hearing shows that an error may 
exist to the extent that previous drug transactions 
had taken place with the person later identified as 
Bobbie Roots, rather than the defendant." R. 212. 
6
 None of the information known to Officer Smith about 
Yolanda would lead to a conclusion that she was reliable. 
Intentionally selecting that adjective to describe her without 
supplying any underlying details served to mislead the magistrate as 
to the source, reliability and veracity of the informant. 
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2. "The affidavit was intended to encompass 
the anticipated drug transaction interrupted later 
that evening. Agent Smith reviewed the affidavit, 
inserted additional information gleaned during the 
course of securing the premises and wrote in the 
affidavit that the anticipated drug transaction was 
not completed." R. 212. 
See Addendum A. 
2. The Material Misrepresentations and Omissions 
Were Made Intentionally or With a Reckless Disregard 
for Their Truth. 
In assessing the impact of the falsehood outlined in 
number 1 above, the trial judge concluded that "even if the source 
of the cocaine was erroneously identified, the error was neither 
willfully represented or made with a reckless disregard for the 
truth, and the remainder of the affidavit amply supports the finding 
of probable cause." R. 213. The trial judge did not discuss the 
intent of the officers in including the other falsehood or in 
excluding the specific facts regarding the officer's relationship 
with the informant, nor did he determine whether probable cause 
existed when the false information was removed or the omitted 
information added. 
The finding of the trial judge that "an error may exist" in 
regard to the assertion that drugs were purchased from Fifi rather 
than Bobby is correct; the evidence establishes that the informant 
bought the drugs from Bobby and told the officers that Bobby was the 
seller. R. 229:16, 17, 18, 21, 42, 63, 80; R. 230:2; R. 234:11. 
Contrary to the trial judge's conclusion that the 
information that the buys were made from Fifi was neither willfully 
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nor recklessly included, the facts of this case indicate that, at 
the very least, the officer acted recklessly in presenting this 
false information to the magistrate. 
Officer Smith testified that Yolanda told him that she made 
the unwitting buy from Bobby. Although he attempted to "backpedal" 
and rely on the recency of the affidavit, his memory indicated that 
Yolanda had named Bobby as the seller. R. 229:17, 18; R. 234:11. 
Yolanda testified that she had purchased drugs from Bobby and not 
from Fifi, and that she had told the officers that she purchased the 
drugs from a large black man. R. 230:2; R. 229:80. 
Although Officer Smith claimed that he did not 
intentionally or recklessly include falsehoods in the affidavit, an 
assessment of the officer's mental state requires inquiry beyond the 
officer's assertions. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Nielsen, 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only of 
the need for accuracy in the information provided to 
a magistrate in support of an application for a 
search warrant, but also of the absolute truthfulness 
of any statements made under oath. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. In the present case, Detective McCarthy 
prepared the affidavit while Officer Smith was attempting to make a 
controlled buy. R. 229:49-50; R. 234:17. Officer Smith, who had 
conveyed the information from Yolanda to Detective McCarthy, then 
reviewed the affidavit. However, at that time, the officers had 
already securcsd the house and were in a hurry to execute the 
warrant. They knew that Bobby, not Fifi, was involved in the 
controlled buy and had, in fact, created the circumstance that 
required the officers to prematurely enter the house. The 
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circumstances requiring entry and the manner in which the officers 
apprehended Bobby should have emphasized Bobby's role in the 
transactions and caused a police officer reading the affidavit for 
accuracy to recognize the falsehood. The nature of the falsehood 
coupled with the manner in which the affidavit was prepared 
demonstrates that, at the very least, the officers acted with a 
reckless disregard for the truth in including this information. 
The record also establishes that the statement that a 
controlled buy was made along with statements referring to that 
controlled buy were false. A controlled buy was not made because 
the attempted controlled buy was aborted when Yolanda called for 
help and the officers burst into the house. R. 234:24-5. Nor did 
the officers search Yolanda after they secured the house. 
R. 229:28. Officer Smith could not remember whether he got any 
money back, nor did he receive cocaine from her. R. 229:28. 
Yolanda testified that no one searched her after the attempted 
controlled buy and that she ended up with change from the 
transaction. R. 229:37, 40. Without searching Yolanda, any 
expectation of finding the money inside the house is not supported 
by underlying facts, and merely a guess on the part of the officers. 
Officer Smith appended an additional page three to the 
affidavit in which he acknowledged: 
Your affiant was unable to complete the controlled 
buy that was mentioned earlier in this 
warrant/affidavit. 
R. 177. At the very least, the officer was reckless in not 
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clarifying what portions of the affidavit were accurate.7 
The additional page three did not point out that the 
informant had not been searched and that the officers had no idea 
whether she had cocaine in her possession, or still had the buy 
money, or neither. While the magistrate may well have understood 
that the controlled buy had not been completed, the ramifications of 
that failure are not as apparent. The affidavit and addendum 
suggest that even though the buy was aborted, it had progressed to 
the point where the informant had purchased the drugs and had 
possession of those drugs after the officers entered the house. The 
magistrate could also have understood from the affidavit that the 
informant no longer had the money. The addendum failed to rectify 
this false information. If this court were to permit an addendum 
which indicates that information in the original affidavit is 
incorrect, it should require that such an addendum clearly state the 
information listed in the affidavit which was not correct, and 
outline for the court what did in fact occur. 
Although Officer Smith was acting hastily in finalizing the 
search warrant affidavit, he nevertheless is required to review the 
affidavit and make sure that it accurately reflects the facts known 
to the officers. In this case, the failure to clarify that the 
7
 This method of preparing a search warrant resulted in a 
confusing document which is unclear as to what did or did not 
happen. Although the Utah Supreme court upheld the warrant in SIowe 
that was prepared prior to the events outlined in the affidavit, the 
events in that case occurred as described. By contrast, in the 
present case, the events did not occur as described and the 
attachment did not clarify precisely what did occur. 
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informant had not been searched and did not have drugs after the 
aborted buy was, at the very least, a reckless presentation of false 
information. 
3. Probable Cause Did Not Exist Absent the 
Misrepresentations. 
Where false information is included in an affidavit either 
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, Franks 
requires that the false information be excised and the remainder of 
the affidavit assessed for probable cause. fl/Probable cause7 is a 
standard requiring the issuing magistrate to make a reasonable 
determination whether 'there is a fair probability that contraband 
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place./M 
State v, Dronebura. 781 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Utah App. 1989), citing 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527, reh/g. denied, 463 U.S. 1237, 104 S.Ct. 33, 77 L.Ed.2d 
1453 (1983). 
In Illinois v. Gates, the United States Supreme Court 
abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test8 which had 
previously been followed in evaluating a search warrant affidavit 
based on an informant's tip, and embraced the broader "totality of 
the circumstances" test. 
8
 The two-prong test evolved from Aauilar v. Texas. 378 
U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. 
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969). 
The two prongs are: (1) the affidavit must establish the basis of 
the informant's knowledge, and (2) the affidavit must establish the 
informant's veracity and reliability. See discussion infra at 32-5. 
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The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make 
a practical, common sense decision whether, given all 
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before 
him, including the 'veracity1 and 'basis of 
knowledge7 of persons supplying hearsay information, 
there is a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place. 
462 U.S. at 238-9 (citations omitted). 
Utah has followed the United States Supreme Court in 
embracing the more general "totality of the circumstances" test in 
the fourth amendment context. See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 
(Utah 1983); State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304; State v. Bailey, 
675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 285 (Utah 
App. 1990). Although rigid compliance with the Aguilar-Spinelli 
guidelines may not be required under Gates, compliance with those 
guidelines may nevertheless "be necessary to make a sufficient basis 
for probable cause." Bailey, 675 P.2d at 12 05. 
Depending on the circumstances, a showing of the 
basis of knowledge and veracity or reliability of the 
person providing the information for the warrant may 
well be necessary to establish with a "fair 
probability" that the evidence sought actually exists 
and can be found where the informant says. 
Id. 
In State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990), this 
Court stated: 
Although the Aguilar-Spinelli guidelines are not to 
be mechanically applied, they are useful even under 
the totality of the circumstances test for 
determining whether the facts establish probable 
cause. The United States Supreme Court has stated 
that veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of 
an informant "should be understood simply as closely 
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the 
common sense practical question of whether there is 
probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence 
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is located in a particular place." Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328; see [State v.] Hansen, 732 
P.2d [127,] 130 (Utah 1987); Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 
1306. (footnote omitted). 
As this Court pointed out in Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1306, the 
veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of 
confidential informants . . . are still relevant 
considerations, among others, in determining the 
existence of probable cause under a 'totality-of-the-
circumstances.' (citations omitted) Otherwise, a 
court cannot determine whether the information was 
obtained in the context of unreliable circumstances 
such as casual rumor. (citation omitted) 
In Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304, this Court also emphasized 
the continuing need for the officer to include specific facts in a 
search warrant affidavit so that a neutral magistrate can adequately 
assess whether probable cause exits. 
"The fourth amendment requires that when a search 
warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit, that 
affidavit must contain specific facts sufficient to 
support a determination by a neutral magistrate that 
probable cause exists." (citation omitted) The 
action of the magistrate, however, must not be "a 
mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others." (citation omitted) Otherwise, the 
magistrate becomes only a "rubber stamp" for police, 
abandoning the neutral and detached role which is "a 
more reliable safeguard against improper searches 
than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement 
officer." (citation omitted) 
Id. 
Where an affidavit does not contain specific facts regarding 
the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of the informant, 
courts look to the specificity and quantity of details supplied by 
the informant, along with the corroboration of such information by 
police officers or the obtaining of additional information by police 
officers in assessing whether probable cause exists. In Droneburg/ 
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this Court held that the search warrant affidavit failed to 
establish probable cause. This Court pointed out that ,f[n]either 
the credibility of the informant nor the reliability of the 
information was ever established." Id. at 1306. In addition, the 
"quantity of information" was insufficient to establish probable 
cause. 
In State v. Bailey, the Supreme Court pointed out that 
although the informant's tip in Gates came from an anonymous letter, 
the affidavit was upheld because the informant supplied details as 
to the drug dealers' mode of operation, and the officer corroborated 
the information "in great detail" before obtaining a warrant. 675 
P.2d at 1206. 
In Bailey, the affidavit indicated that the informant had 
"previously given truthful information to the police concerning the 
existence of contraband" and "the reliability of the informant as 
'boosted by the detail with which the informant described his 
personal observation.'" Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206. 
State v. Brown involved a tip from a citizen informant. 
This Court pointed out that "[c]ourts view the testimony of citizen 
informers with less rigid scrutiny than the testimony of police 
informers. (citation omitted).... This is because citizen 
informers, unlike police informers, volunteer information out of 
concern for the community and not for personal benefit." Brown, 798 
P.2d at 286. Nevertheless, the informer in Brown identified 
himself, gave details as to an incident in which he confronted 
children leaving the house with baggies of marijuana, and described 
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the house and greenhouse in question in detail. Officers then 
verified as many of the details given by the informer as they could, 
and independently observed and gained other facts. Only then did 
the officers obtain a warrant. 
In the present case, although the affidavit refers to 
Yolanda as a reliable informant or "RI" at least fifteen times, it 
does not contain any details as to her veracity or reliability. The 
officer's mere conclusion that she is reliable is not sufficient. 
Two items in the affidavit relate to the informant's basis 
of knowledge. First, the general statement that "RI has been inside 
the premises and has made purchases of cocaine." The dates or 
number of such transactions is not set out, and the testimony of 
Yolanda and Officer Smith is unclear as to whether she had been in 
the premises before the unwitting buy. 
Second, the statement contained in paragraph six on page two 
which indicates that the informant went inside the premises on an 
unwitting buy and returned in less than a minute and gave cocaine to 
the officer. Although the officer included a conclusory statement 
that "the only possible source for the cocaine on each buy occasion 
was the inside of the premises," such conclusion is not true since 
the informant could have had the drugs on her person prior to 
entering the premises for the unwitting transaction. Furthermore, 
such conclusion does not let the magistrate do his job. 
The affidavit contains no details regarding any prior 
purchases nor any specific information abut the occupants of the 
house. The officer's testimony establishes that Yolanda was not in 
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fact a reliable informant, had never been used by a police officer, 
and was a drug addict who was picked up on the street that night and 
stood to benefit from cooperating with officers,9 
When the false portions of this affidavit are excised, and 
the omitted portions added, the remaining information fails to 
establish probable cause. 
B. THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT WERE 
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person or thing to be seized. 
It is well established that Utah is free to interpret 
Article I, section 14 of its state constitution differently from the 
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. See State v. 
Sims, Case No. 890463-CA (March 15, 1991); State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 465-6 (Utah 1990); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 
1988); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Laffertv, 
749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988); State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 
9
 The information about Fifi's prior arrest is irrelevant 
to a probable cause determination since the affidavit, when false 
portions are excised, does not link the house or transactions to 
Fifi. In addition, although the affidavit states that the RI 
observed various items of paraphernalia inside the premises, 
Yolanda's testimony contradicted that statement and the officer 
could not remember whether she had told him that she saw such items 
inside. He did testify, however, that including such an observation 
in an affidavit is common practice. 
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271-72 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged that 
federal law under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth of 
rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing 
rationalizations and distinctions" (Hyqh, 711 P.2d at 271-2) and 
that in certain contexts, a distinct analysis under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution may be preferable to a fourth 
amendment analysis. Id., see also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95 
n.7 (Utah App. 1987) (overruled); Id. at 103-5 (Billings, J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
In Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465, the Supreme Court relied on 
Article I, section 14 in deciding that "an officers opening a car 
door to examine a VIN on a door jamb" constituted an unreasonable 
search under the state constitution. The Court recognized that 
federal fourth amendment law, especially in the context of 
automobile searches, "has been a source of much confusion among 
judges, lawyers and police." Jd. at 466. Although the Court 
indicated that if it were deciding the case under federal law, it 
"would hold that a search was conducted within the meaning of the 
fourth amendment," it nevertheless reached its decision under the 
state constitution. The Court stated: 
The time has come for this court, in applying an 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement of 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, to 
try to simplify, if possible, the search and seizure 
rules so that they can be more easily followed by the 
police and courts and, at the same time, provide the 
public with consistent and predictable protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
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See also State v. Sims, Case No. 890463-CA (March 15, 1991) 
(roadblock violates Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution). 
Case law from Utah and other jurisdictions supports a 
distinct analysis under Article I, section 14 where an officer 
includes falsehoods in an affidavit. 
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court 
concluded that the falsehood contained in the affidavit was not 
material and upheld the search warrant under the Franks fourth 
amendment analysis. The Court pointed out, however, that the 
decision was not dispositive of how the issue might be resolved 
under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The Court 
acknowledged that "the federal law it has developed since Franks v. 
Delaware is not entirely adequate" and that "[t]here is no stronger 
argument for developing adequate remedies for violation of the state 
and federal constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and 
seizures than the example of a police officer deliberately lying 
under oath in order to obtain a search warrant." Id. at 192-3. 
Hence, an analysis under the Utah Constitution distinct from that in 
Franks v. Delaware is appropriate where misrepresentations are 
included in an affidavit in support of a search warrant or omitted 
therefrom.10 
1 0
 In Franks, the defendant "conceded that if what is left 
is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are 
irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no reason to 
believe the information was false, there was no violation of the 
Fourth Amendment." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172. Hence, the 
issue of whether an intentional or reckless misrepresentation in an 
affidavit invalidates the search warrant was not presented to the 
high court. 
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Where officers include falsehoods in a search warrant 
affidavit, case law from other jurisdictions supports Ms. Buford's 
argument that under the Utah Constitution (1) intentional 
misrepresentations should invalidate the warrant regardless of 
whether probable cause exists after the offensive portions are 
excised, and (2) where an officer negligently includes falsehoods, 
the falsehoods should be excised and the remainder of the affidavit 
assessed for a determination as to whether probable cause exists. 
See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 (Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin, 
722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986); State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La. 
1980); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
Franks v. Delaware, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out 
that "[i]f the affiant intentionally makes false statements to 
mislead a judicial officer on application for a warrant, these 
falsehoods render the warrant invalid regardless of whether or not 
such statements are material to establishing probable cause." 
United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United 
States v. Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974). 
The Alaska Supreme Court has deviated from the decision in 
Franks in interpreting its constitutional proscription against 
unreasonable search and seizure. See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275 
(Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986). In 
State v. Malkin, the Court noted: 
If, in fact, the police officer affiant intentionally 
made the misstatements then the search warrant should 
be invalidated whether or not probable cause would 
remain from the affidavit after the misstatements 
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were excised, A deliberate attempt to mislead a 
judicial officer in a sworn affidavit deserves the 
most severe deterrent sanction that the exclusionary 
rule can provide. Further, the fact that the officer 
has lied puts the credibility of the officer and of 
the entire affidavit into doubt. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 946 n.6. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion 
that a warrant cannot "survive the intentional deception of a 
magistrate by an affiant11 in State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La. 
1980). 
In People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978), the California 
Supreme Court also determined that where deliberate falsehoods are 
contained in an affidavit, the entire affidavit and search warrant 
must be quashed. The Court noted: 
Contrciry to the case of negligent mistakes, excision 
of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit does not 
leave the remaining allegations unaffected and hence 
presumptively true. The fact that the misstatements 
are intentional injects a new element into the 
analysis, to wit, the doctrine that a witness 
knowingly false in one part of his testimony is to be 
distrusted in the whole. 
Id. at 140. The Court summed up that "although the court can excise 
the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder 
to be true. Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the 
court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but 
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search. [Citations 
omitted.]" Id. at 141. 
The Court pointed out that elimination of intentional 
falsehoods is not enough since officers would have "everything to 
gain and nothing to lose in strengthening an otherwise marginal 
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affidavit by letting their intense dedication to duty blur the 
distinction between fact and fantasy. [Citations omitted.]" Id. 
The reasoning of the Alaska, Louisiana and California 
courts, when read together with Nielsen should be adopted when 
analyzing Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Where an 
officer intentionally includes false information in an affidavit or 
includes such information with a reckless disregard for its truth, 
the search warrant should be invalidated. The fact that a 
significant misrepresentation was included in an affidavit, despite 
the officer's awareness of the necessity for accuracy (see State v. 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191), raises a question as to the reliability 
and veracity of the information contained in the rest of the 
affidavit. Furthermore, officers who intentionally or recklessly 
include falsehoods in an affidavit should realize that negative 
repercussions will result from the use of such misrepresentations. 
In the present case, where significant misrepresentations 
along with material omissions as to the reliability of the informant 
were included either intentionally or recklessly in the affidavit, 
the entire affidavit becomes suspect. Rather than attempting to 
excise the many falsehoods and insert the omissions, this Court 
should adopt the more straightforward approach that Article I, 
section 14 requires that an affidavit be invalidated where an 
officer intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth 
swears to a material misrepresentation. 
California courts have also held that where a 
misrepresentation is negligently included in an affidavit, the 
- 31 -
misrepresentation must be excised and the affidavit reviewed for a 
determination as to whether probable cause exists absent the false 
statement. See People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) 
(modified on denial of reh'g.); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 
1978). 
Including the false statements as to Yolanda's reliability 
and the buys being made from Fifi was, at the very least, a 
negligent act by officers. Even if this Court determines that 
Officer Smith was merely negligent in including the false 
statements, it should nevertheless, under Article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, excise the false statements and review the 
remainder of the affidavit for probable cause.11 
The affidavit absent the false statements, as set forth in 
Point IA above, does not set forth sufficient facts for a finding of 
probable cause and the search warrant should therefore be quashed 
and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant suppressed. In 
addition, the basis of knowledge (the first prong of the 
Aauilar-Spinelli test) is not clear; furthermore, facts outlining 
Yolanda's credibility or the reliability of the information are not 
included in the affidavit. Pursuant to Article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution, the illegally seized evidence should be 
excluded. See State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d at 471-3; Sims, slip op. 
at 19. 
1 1
 As Ms. Buford sets forth more fully in Point II, infra 
at 32, the appropriate analysis for whether probable cause exists 
under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution is the 
two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test. 
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Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse her 
conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the illegally 
seized evidence, or, in the alternative, dismissal. 
POINT II: THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I. SECTION 14 
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
As set forth in Point IB, supra at 26, appellate courts in 
this State have interpreted, in various contexts, Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution to provide greater protection 
than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. See 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 465; State v. Sims, slip op. at 11. 
Although this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
embraced the totality of the circumstances test set forth in 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 212, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 
(1983), they have done so in a fourth amendment context. See 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Bailev, 675 P.2d 
1203 (Utah 1984); State v. Droneburq. 781 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 
1989). Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has addressed the 
issue of whether the Aguilar-Spinelli12 two-prong test should be 
applicable under the Utah Constitution. 
1 2
 The test was derived from the cases of Aauilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and 
SPinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 
637 (1969). In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned the 
two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test and embraced the more general 
"totality of the circumstances" test. 
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The two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli test requires that the 
affidavit in support of a search warrant set forth: 
(1) the basis of the informant's 
knowledge, and 
(2) facts establishing the credibility of 
the informant or the reliability of the 
information. 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. at 114; Spinelli v. United States, 398 
U.S. at 413; Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1205. 
Various reasons exist for embracing the Aquilar-Spinelli 
test under the Utah Constitution rather than the more nebulous 
"totality of the circumstances" test. 
Requiring officers to set forth in the affidavit the 
underlying facts and circumstances enhances the role of the neutral 
and detached magistrate. See State v. Jones. 706 P.2d 317, 322 
(Alaska 1985); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984); 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J. dissenting). (The magistrate 
must "make the proper independent judgment about the persuasiveness 
of the facts relied upon by the officer.") 
The two-prong test provides a more practical, workable test 
than the more nebulous totality of the circumstances test, thereby 
providing greater assurance that Article I, section 14 will not be 
violated. As the court pointed out in Jones, 706 P.2d at 322, the 
Aquilar-Spinelli test did not "reduce[] probable cause to a neat, 
artificial set of legal rules." 
Rather, the two-pronged test provided a structure 
for probable cause inquiries, and if not rigidly 
applied, allowed sufficient room for assessment of 
the unique facts of the particular case. 
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Id, citing W. LaFave, Search and Seizure; A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment, § 3.3 at 136 (1984 Supp). 
As Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Gates, 103 S.Ct. 
at 2357, 76 L.Ed.2d at 580: 
Aauilar and Spinelli require the police to provide 
magistrates with certain crucial information. 
They also provide structure for magistrates7 
probable cause inquiries. In so doing, Aauilar 
and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates as 
independent arbiters of probable cause, insure 
greater accuracy in probable cause determinations, 
and advance the substantive value of precluding 
findings of probable cause, and attendant 
intrusions, based on anything less than 
information from an honest or credible person who 
has acquired his information in a reliable way. 
Various state courts have adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli test 
for analyzing search warrants under their state's constitution. 
State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317; State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136; 
State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985); Commonwealth v. Upton, 
480 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1983); People v. Johnson, 488 N.E.2d 439 (NY 
1985). See generally Note, United States v. Leon and Illinois v. 
Gates: A Call for State Courts to Develop State Constitutional Law, 
1987 U.111.L.Rev. 311 (1987); Ryan, Is the Two-Prong Test of 
Aguilar-Spinelli Alive and Well in California?, 13 W.St.U.L.Rev. 45 
(1985) . 
Given the unique circumstances under which the Utah 
Constitution was enacted, the preference for warrants under the Utah 
Constitution (see State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 469-70), and the 
more practical and workable guidelines of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, 
this Court should apply that test in assessing search warrants under 
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Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
In the present case, the affidavit fails to set forth facts 
establishing either the credibility of the informant or the 
reliability of the information, as required by the second prong of 
the Aauilar-Spinelli test. Instead, it relies on the officer's 
conclusion that she was a reliable informant. As a result, the 
affidavit fails state probable cause under the Utah Constitution; 
the remedy for this violation is exclusion of the evidence seized. 
Moreover, the basis of the knowledge is one unwitting and 
uncontrolled buy. This is not sufficient to establish probable 
cause. The appropriate remedy where Article I, section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution is violated is exclusion of the illegally seized 
evidence. State v. Laroccof 794 P. 2d at 472. 
POINT III. THE AFFIDAVIT FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Pursuant to the fourth amendment, a search warrant affidavit 
must outline facts which establish a fair probability under the 
totality of circumstances that the evidence will be found in the 
place to be searched. State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304; Gates, 
462 U.S. at 238. The two-prong Aquilar-Spinelli test is one 
consideration under the Gates test. State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d at 
1205. Where "[n]either the credibility of the informant nor the 
reliability of the information is established and the quantity of 
the information is minimal, probable cause is not established. 
State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304. 
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In the present case, not only was the two-prong 
Acruilar-Spinelli test not met, the quantity of information in the 
affidavit was so minimal that it failed to outline probable cause. 
The evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should therefore 
be suppressed. 
POINT IV. "GOOD FAITH" DOES NOT SAVE THE WARRANT 
UNDER EITHER THE UTAH OR UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
The issue of whether an officer relied in good faith on a 
warrant "is subject to de novo determination" by the appellate 
court. State v. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 1991), 
citing United States v. Frietas, 800 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1986). 
A. THE FEDERAL GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT 
APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
The "good faith" exception to the probable cause requirement 
under the fourth amendment which was created in United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), rehTg. 
denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984), and its 
companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 1045 S.Ct. 
3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), does not permit the admission evidence 
seized in this case. 
The United States Supreme Court created the "good faith" 
exception to allow the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a 
search warrant which later proved to be defective where the 
"officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their 
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conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment." Leon, 468 U.S. at 
918. While in some circumstances it is objectively reasonable to 
believe that a search warrant is valid (see, e.g., Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989), the high court made it clear "that in 
some circumstances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for 
believing that the warrant was properly issued." Id. at 922. The 
Court pointed out: 
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate 
remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a 
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit 
that the affiant knew was false or would have 
known was false except for his reckless disregard 
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978). 
Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith 
in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit "so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable." (Citations omitted.) Finally, 
depending on the circumstances of the particular 
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e. 
in failing to particularize the place to be 
searched or the things to be seized—that the 
executing officers cannot presume it to be valid. 
Id. at 923. 
Furthermore, as this Court pointed out in State v. Rowe, 154 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 16, citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 915, "[w]hen the 
magistrate reviewing the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
is not presented with sufficient facts to determine probable cause, 
the warrant cannot be relied upon by searching officers." 
In the present case, the officers intentionally or 
recklessly included false information and failed to include facts 
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sufficient to establish probable cause. Reliance on the search 
warrant was therefore not reasonable and the good faith exception 
under the fourth amendment was not applicable. 
B. A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT EXIST UNDER 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has decided 
the issue of whether a good faith exception exists under Article I, 
section 14 of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Thompson, Case 
No. 880181 (March 21, 1991) slip op. at 7-9; State v. Rowe, 154 Utah 
Adv. Rep. at 16, 17-21. 
In footnote 8 in State v. Rowe. 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21, 
this Court noted that "neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court 
has held that a parallel doctrine to the Leon exception would apply 
in the context of Utah's exclusionary rule[]" and pointed out that 
"[m]any state courts have determined that exclusionary rules 
existing by virtue of state constitutional provisions are not 
subject to a Leon-type 'good faith7 exception. See, e.g., State v. 
Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 579 A.2d 58, 68 (1990); People v. Sundlina. 
153 Mich. App. 277, 395 N.W.2d 308, 315 (1986), appeal denied 428 
Mich. 887 (1987); State v. Carter, 322 N.C. 709, 370 S.E.2d 553 
(1988); State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (1987); 
People v. Bicrelow. 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.Ed.2d 451, 457-8 (1985)." 
Although in Thompson, the Supreme Court left "for another 
day the issue of whether to apply inappropriate circumstances a good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule to Article I, section 14 of 
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the Utah Constitution," (State v. Thompson, slip op. at 9), it 
pointed out in footnote 4 that H[t]he Supreme Court of Connecticut 
recently held that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
was incompatible with its constitution. State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 
58 (1990)." State v. Thompson, slip op. at 9. 
Furthermore, an "Appendix" to the opinion in State v. Rowe, 
154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 17-21, traces the history of the exclusionary 
rule and the Leon "good faith" exception, concluding: 
As and when the appellate courts of this 
state are squarely confronted with the question of 
whether the exclusionary rule existing by virtue 
of Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution 
is subject to a Leon-type "good faith" exception, 
a healthy skepticism should permeate the courts7 
consideration in view of the troublesome analysis 
in Leon. 
State v. Rowe, 154 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20. 
In his dissent in Leon, 468 U.S. at 928-960, Justice Brennan 
traced the history of the exclusionary rule and outlined the 
argument for rejecting a good faith exception under the fourth 
amendment. At the outset, he pointed out that the good faith 
exception is premised on the idea that the exclusionary rule is "a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment 
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a 
personal constitutional right." 468 U.S.at 931, citing 468 U.S. at 
906, quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 
613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Justice Brennan disagreed and 
reiterated the position he outlined in United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. at 57 6-582, that the exclusionary rule is constitutionally 
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generated and not judicially created and traces the history of that 
rule in support of his position. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 460, the Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged Justice Brennan's dissent in Calandra and expressly 
left open the question of whether the exclusionary rule applicable 
to Utah constitutional violations was a constitutional requirement. 
Given the history and importance of the rule as well as the 
troubling and confusing analysis federally, this Court should 
determine that the exclusionary rule is mandated by the Utah 
Constitution and is not merely a judicially created remedy. See 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 702, Brennan, J. dissenting. The importance of 
such a resolution is that if the exclusionary rule is 
constitutionally mandated, a good faith exception cannot exist. 
In addition to asserting that a good faith exception should 
not exist under the Utah Constitution, Ms. Buford reiterates her 
argument in Point IVA, supra at 36-38, that even if a good faith 
exception exists under Article I, section 14, reliance on the 
warrant in this case was not reasonable since the affidavit was 
lacking in facts to support probable cause and misrepresentations 
were intentionally or recklessly included in the affidavit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse her 
conviction and remand this case for a new trial absent the illegally 
seized evidence, 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of April, 1991. 
M 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
V N, ^ 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
Case No. 891900113 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
This matter having been heard before this Court on August 
23 and 24, 1989, Defendant appearing in person and represented by 
her counsel, James Bradshaw, esq., and the State appearing by and 
through its counsel, B. Kent Morgan, Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney; and the Court having heard testimony, reviewed the 
memorandum of points and authorities submitted by respective 
counsel, having carefully considering arguments presented, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 4, 1989 at approximately 12:25 A.M., Metro 
Narcotics Agents were monitoring conversation over a wireless 
transmitter concealed on the person of a then confidential 
00210 
informant, Yolanda Rodriguez who was attmepting to make an 
undercover purchase of cocaine from an individual later identified 
as Bobbie Roots. During the course of the transaction which was 
occurring at a residence at 474 North 740 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, Mr. Roots made unwelcome sexual advances towards Ms. 
Rodriguez which resulted in no less than three separate pleas for 
help to the agents. The narcotics agents called for back up and 
determined to enter the residence when the cries for help were 
accompanied by a banging sound which one of the agents described as 
sounding as though Ms. Rodriguez had barricaded herself against a 
door and someone was trying to get in. 
2. Upon forcibly entering the residence, several narcotics 
agents dispersed throughout the three floors of the residence and 
secured several individuals. It was not until Bobbie Roots was 
apprehended with some amount of struggle in the lowest floor of the 
residence that Ms. Rodriguez finally was located in the bathroom on 
the main floor. On the upper floor of the residence, the defendant 
and several other individuals were observed along with numerous 
items of drug paraphernalia and what appeared to be a substantial 
amount of cocaine on a table. No items were moved or confiscated at 
that time nor was any more than a cursory search made for 
individuals who may have fled or posed a danger to the officers. 
3. Earlier that day, preparations for the affidavit in 
support of a search warrant had begun as a result of an "unwitting 
purchase of cocaine" by Ms. Rodriguez who had taken undercover Agent 
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00211 
Zane Smith to the residence she represented as her source of 
cocaine. The information contained in the affidavit was obtained 
from Ms. Rodriguez, other police officers and records maintained by 
the State of Utah Bureau of Criminal Identification, Corrections, 
and Metro Narcotics. The affidavit was intended to encompass the 
anticipated drug transaction interrupted later that evening. Agent 
Smith reviewed the affidavit, inserted additional information 
gleaned during the course of securing the premises and wrote in the 
affidavit that the anticipated drug transaction was not completed. 
The testimony adduced during the course of the suppression hearing 
shows that an error may exist to the extent that previous drug 
transactions had taken place with the person later identified as 
Bobbie Roots, rather than the defendant. 
4. The search warrant affidavit was presented and signed 
at approximately 1:40 P.M. that evening and executed in reliance 
upon that authorization resulting in the seizure of items sought to 
be used as evidence against the defendant. 
Having entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now enters 
its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Exigent circumstances existed justifying the 
warrantless entry into the residence, and therefore the entry and 
observations made during the search of the residence for individuals 
was reasonable under the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
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0021^ 
2. Under the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit 
in support of the search warrant constituted probable cause to 
justify its issuance, and even if the source of the cocaine was 
erroneously identified, the error was neither willfully represented 
or made with reckless disregard for the truth, and the remainder of 
the affidavit amply supports the finding of probable cause. 
3. The warrant was executed in good faith reliance upon 
the authorization of the issuing magistrate which led to the items 
sought to be used against the defendant as evidence. 
Having entered its Conclusions of Law; 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress is denied. yf 





HONORABLE RAYMOND S. UNO 
Third District Court Judge 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, DT 84111 






IN THE THIRD COURT 
IN AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s 
County of Sa le Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: TYRONE MEDLEY , 2470 S o u t h R 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The unde r s igned a f f i a n t be ing f i r s t duly sworn, deposes and s a y s : 
Tha t he /SSe^has reason t o b e l i e v e 
T h a t X£$ on the p e r s o n ( s ) of OPHELIA BUFQRD , 7 / 1 6 / 2 9 , F e m a l e B l a c k 
( ) i n tb* c h i c l e ( s ) d e s c r i b e d as 
X^C^ on the premises known as 474 N o r t h 7 4 0 T J e s t . S a l t Lake C i e v 
a w h i t e i n c o l o r d u p l e x on t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e ooad f a c -
ig W e s t , t h e a p t on t h e S o u t h s i d e . 
I n t h e Ci ty of S a l t L a k e , County of S a l t Lake , S t a t e of Utah, t h e r e 
i s now c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y of ev idence desc r ibed a s : 
SEE ATTACHMENT " A " 
and t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e : 
£ 3 was unlawful ly a c q u i r e d or i s unlawful ly p o s s e s s e d ; 
fr.% has been used to commit or conceal a p u b l i c o f f e n s e ; 
£ $ i s being posses sed wi th the purpose to use i t as a means of 
committing or c o n c e a l i n g a pub l i c o f f e n s e ; 
£ 3 c o n s i s t s of an i t em or c o n s t i t u t e s ev idence of i l l e g a l conduct, 
possessed by a p a r t y to the i l l e g a l conduc t ; 
( ) c o n s i s t s of an i t em or c o n s t i t u t e s evidence of i l l e g a l conduct, 
possessed by a pe r son or e n t i t y not a p a r t y to the i l l e g a l 
conduct . (Note r equ i rements of Utah Code Annota ted , 77-23-3(2)) 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s the p rope r ty a.nd evidence descr ibed above i s evidence of c h d L / O l ^ ^ : 
c r i m e ( s ) of P o s s e s s i o n of C o n t r o l l e d S u b s t a n c e , P o s s e s s i o n W / I n t e n t 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to es tabl i sh the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
Your a f f i a n t D e t e c t i v e Zane Smith , RQ1, i s employed by the Sa l t Lake 
i t y P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t , p r e s e n t l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e Metro N a r c o t i c s S t r i k e 
^ c e . Your a f f i a n t has Been a peace o f f i c e r f o r 5 y e a r s and i s c e r t i -
.ed by t h e S t a t e TJtah as a Peace O f f i c e r . Your a f f i a n t has been g iven 
te r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to i n v e s t i g a t e n a r c o t i c s s a l e s and p o s s e s s i o n o f f e n s e s 
Occurring i n S a l t Lake County and the s u r r o u n d i n g a r e a s . 
four a f f i a n t has had t r a i n i n g in the n a r c o t i c s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and in the 
I n v e s t i g a t i o n of n a r c o t i c s r e l a t e d o f f e n s e s . A f f i a n t has p e r s o n a l l y pur-
c h a s e d v a r i o u s n a r c o t i c s on numerous o c c a s i o n s i n r e l a t i o n to p o l i c e i n -
v e s t i g a t i o n s . A f f i a n t has been a s s i g n e d to t h e Metro N a r c o t i c s S tr ike Fore 
Jfor 10 m o n t h s . A f f i a n t has worked w i t h o t h e r e x p e r i e n c e d o f f i c e r s in t h i s 
f i e l d and has s e r v e d numerous s e a r c h w a r r a n t s f o r the e v i d e n c e of n a r c o t i c s 
[ O f f e n s e s . 
f 
pur affiant is presently conducting a narcotics slaes investigation being 
erated at the premisses described on this warrant/affidavit. Affiant has 
xtfterviewed a reliable informant, Yolanda R .^  Rodriguez
 y hereinafter re-
ferred to as RI ^ - ^ ^ 
^RI tolf your affiant that cocaine is being jsold from the premisses named 
arJ described on this warrant/affidavit. RI has been inside the premisses 
av_ 'has made/^u^j^se>^ of coaine. RI has observed drug paraphernalia inside 
the premisses "to^ Lnclu'cle a set of scales, vials for cooking cocaine, (crack),1 
pipes, razor blades and paper bindles pre-made and evidence of drug posses-
sion and distribution listed on this warrant/affidavit. 
RI has cooperated with your affiant and has made one unwitting buy and one/ : 
controlled buy both, within the last-.S Hours from the premisses listed on h^^f 
this warrant/affidavit. RI has also cooperated with vour affiant by pro- / i^A C 
Yjjj 1 n g -^4 1 -fripnMcy jn_ the form of name, date of birth, and home address/ 
During^ the unwitting buy of cocaine RI was given Metro Buy Honey after 
[deriving RI .Cg Khf> nrPTn-fgP listed and observed entering then exiting, Jin 
TTess than 1 minute and return to your affiant with cocaine. During the 
*c"ontrol!led buy the RI was searched before and after the buy. The RI was gi^ 
ven Metro Narcotics- Buy Money listed in attachment A prior to the buy. The 
Ri was found in possession of cocaine after the buy and did not have the 
Metro Buy Money. The RI was kept under constant surveillance as the RI 
approached and returned from the premises. Based on affiant's observations 
and surveillance, the only possible source for the cocaine on each buy 
occasion was the inside of the premises named and described on this warrant/ 
affidavit . 
RI has told your affiant that each buy of cocaine was made from FIFI while 
inside the premises listed on rhis warrant/affidavit. Your affiant has been 
able to identify suspect FIFI from Metro Det. McCarthy. Your affiant was 
informed by Det. McCarthy that FIFI was identified by past narcotics sales 
and attached is copy of suspects prior arrest, to include priors for posses-
sion of controlled substance with intent to distribute cocaine as well as 




AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
f i a n t has a l s o r e c e i v e d a copy of a p r i n t o u t i n which s u s p e c t OPHELIA 
CJFOR i s shown to be on probat ion for D i s t . Drugs For V a l u e , a l s o a t t a c h e d 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t the Metro buy money l i s t e d on t h i s w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t 
w i l l s t i l l be on the o r e m i s e s . Based on a f f i a n t ' s t r a i n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e , 
a f f i a n t s b e l i e v e s s u s p e c t s keep cash on hand which i s f r u i t s of t h e i r c r i m e s 
and i s u s e d t o make change during t r a n s a c t i o n s and to m a i n t a i n s such an e n t e r -
p r i s e . 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t c o c a i n e and m a t e r i a l s for p a c k a s i n g c o c a i n e w i l l be 
found on t h e p r e m i s e s . On each o c c a s i o n s p e c i f i c amounts were asked for w i t h 
o u t RI c o n t a c t i n g t h e s u s p e c t p r i o r to a r r i v i n g a t the premises l i s t e d . RI 
a l s o has t o l d your a f f i a n t tha t RI has o b s e r v e d pre-made b i n d l e s whi le i n s i d e 
t h e p r e m i s e s l i s t e d . RI has a l s o t o l d your a f f i a n t that susDect has s c a l e s 
i n s i d e t h e p r e m i s e s , your a f f i a n t r e c o g n i z e s s c a l e s as an inherent Dart of a 
drug s a l e s o p e r a t i o n ; they are n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n and conduct such an 
o p e r a t i o n . 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t the premises should a l s o be searched for n a r c o t i c s 
t r a n s a c t i o n s , r e c o r d s , persona l n o t a t i o n s d e s c r i b i n g amounts s o l d , d a t e s 
s o l d , t o whom drugs were so ld and drug i n d e b t n e s s . Such r e c o r d s have been 
found on a l m o s t a l l o c c a s i o n s where your a f f i a n t and o t h e r o f f i c e r s have 
s e r v e d n a r c o t i c s s e a r c h w a r r a n t s . A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s from h i s exper i ence and 
t r a i n i n g t h a t such recordd w i l l be p r e s e n t on the p r e m i s e s named on t h i s 
w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t . 
RI has a l s o t o l d your a f f i a n t tha t RI has o b s e r v e d s u s n e c t BUFORD with 
what a p p e a r e d to be .38 c a l Smith and Wesson, as r e c e n t l y as two days a g o . 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential informant 
r e l i a b l e because ( i f any information i s obtained from an unnamed source.) 
See Body of A f f i d a v i t 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential informant 
to be correct and accurate through the following independent investigation: 
C0176 
•/HUEE CONTINUED 
/AYXT o* SEARCH: WARRANT 
jr affiant was attempting to complete the controlled buy aforementioned 
% this warrant/affidavit on 1/4/89 at approximately 0025hrs at the address 
.isted on this warrant/affidavit. During the control buy your affiant was 
monitoring the RI with body bug transmitter when your affiant and Det. 
DeWitt heard the RI call for hfilp at least three times. Tour affiant also 
could hear what sounded like a male person attempt to direct the RI into 
a section of the premises that the RI did not want to go. Seconds later 
your affiint and Det DeWitt could hear loud tumultuous banging sounds 
that affiant and Det DeWitt perceliu4->Ajs an assault the RI. Entry was made 
by your affiant and Det DeW«&4rfe^^e^iirgffr^ the safety of the RI, your 
affiant jiaving knowledge of y^^po^otiens~gajby one flf PH* ftn^P^-p^fiTire 
erit^ rv yas-a-^iir and "Trgr^ cf'&s" iJslda fftA pro^nn g .«gfl»pnrf fnr pff^er safety 
found in plain view was, _l/8 VO-T^'P ftf rmn^t\xie on a nightstand inside CI £ , .  _ . 
4gain bedroom upjscairs> Also youif a f f i a n t observed in p l a i n view two p ipes 
which appea red to hav^s^been" used^Jj>r^smoking c o c a i n e in the same bedroom. 
Your a f f i a n t was unab le to complete the c o n t r o l l e d buy t h a t was mentioned 
e a r l i e r i n t h i s w a r r a n t / a f f i d a v i t . 
COI77 
/CENT "A" 
,lne, a white crystalline powder, a controlled substance, cocaine para-
yrnalia, to include but not limited to: milk sugar, baking soda, scales, 
/d other weighing devices used for measuring weights, paper bindles, plas-
tic bags, spoons, syringes, short straws, mirrors, razor blades, pipes for 
Smoking cocaine in varied sizes and shapes and other instrumentalities used 
for ingestion and sales of cocaine. 
Articles of personal property to include but not limited to items of person-
al property to establish the identity of persons in control of the premises, 
storage areas and containers being searched including utility company re-
ceipts, rent receipts, addressed envelopes and keys. 
Articles jf personal property tending to establish and document sales of 
cocaine consisting of buyer lists, recordations of sales, to include amounts 
purchased and indebtness owed by other purchasers of cocaine. 
U.S. Currency, Metro Narcotics Buy Money herein listed by denomination and 
serial nunbers; 
5100.00 B92133820B 
$100.00 A0I516977A 
°oi7S 
